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Prologue 
M aralinga. The nan1e rolls easily off the tongue. It is a rather beautiful naine, an Aboriginal word, but fittingly, given the 
colonialism at the heart of the Maralinga story, one not anchored 
in the place itself. The Indigenous people who lived in this part of 
South Australia for tens of thousands of years never spoke this word 
until it was transplanted there by white men. The nan1e, fron1 an 
extinct Aboriginal language called Garik, was officially adopted at a 
1neeting of six Australian public servants and senior inilitary person-
nel, the Research and Develop1nent Branch of the Commonwealth 
Depart1nent of Supply. At 10 a111 sharp on Wednesday 25 N ove1n-
ber 1953, long-time chief scientist for the departn1ent, the New 
Zealand-born Alan Butement, tabled it as the first order of business. 
He almost certainly got the natne fron1 anthropologists working 
in the Northern Territory, although the 111eeting 111inutes do not 
record that detail. 
The new name met with the approval of the British 'nuclear elite', 
the top nuclear scientists fron1 the Atonuc Weapons Research Estab-
lishment (AWRE) at Aldern1aston in southeast England. Charged 
with finding the right place to test British nuclear weapons, these 
n1en appropriated thousands of square kil01netres of South Austral-
ian desert known to surveyors simply as X300. They turned a pris-
tine Australian wilderness into one of the most contanlinated places 
on earth in the pursuit of technological and geopolitical nught for 
the United Kingdom (UK). 
The nuclear tests started in October 1952 at Monte Bello Islands 
off the coast of Western Australia and moved briefly to a retnote 
South Australian site called En1u Field in 1953. Even before they 
went to Emu, though, the scientists knew that it was not suitable for 
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the expansive pennanent location they wanted. Instead, Maralinga, 
not far to the south of En1u, was destined to be the final choice. A 
formal agreen1ent to carry out aton1ic tests at Maralinga was signed 
by the British and Australian govern1nents on 7 March 1956. The 
first 1najor bo111b tests got underway there six months later. 
The vvord Maralinga means 'thunder' in Garik, a language once 
spoken by the people who lived around Port Essington. This short-
lived British settlement, established in the early nineteenth century 
on the Cobourg Peninsula across fron1 Darwin, today lies in ruins. 
Maralinga was one of a handful of Garik words recorded by anthro-
pologists working in the territory; there are no known speakers 
today. Those who bound the word forever to the wildly beautiful 
red dust land in South Australia knew that it was exactly the right 
name. The thunder that rolled across the plains was an ominous 
sound that heralded a new leading player in a nuclear-anned and 
infinitely nlore dangerous world. 
The British nuclear tests in Australia had their direct beginnings 
in the Manhattan Project. This secret wartime project created the 
atonuc bon1bs dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshin1a and 
Nagasaki in August 1945, effectively ending the war in the Pacific. 
The project harboured ato1nic physicist spies, and their uncovering 
cleaved the alliance between Britain and the United States (US) that 
had produced the bo1nbs. The British then turned their eyes towards 
the vast open spaces of Australia. 
Indirectly, historical forces had long been conspiring to lead 
British scientists to the Australian outback. The British colonisation 
of Australia in the eighteenth century m.ay well be the true starting 
point for this saga. The English explorer Jan1es Cook first planted 
the Union Jack on Australian soil in April 1770, during his epic 
scientific expedition. Soon after, the entire continent was absorbed 
into the British Einpire, where it re111ained until 1. 901. This created 
a power differential in the relationship between the two lands. Even 
after Australia became a sovereign nation, strong echoes of its colo-
nial past rang down through the generations, including the years 
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when the British conducted nuclear tests on Australian territory 
between 1952 and 1963. 
A subspecies of the colonialis1n that first clai111ed this island con-
tinent pervades this story. After World War II, as Britain's re1naining 
colonies achieved independence one by one, its days as the world's 
biggest in1perial power petered out. Colonialisn1 as a broader force 
receded, but a new forn1 e1nerged: nuclear colonialis1n. The tenn 
was coined recently - in 1992 - by the US anti-nuclear weap-
ons testing activist Jennifer Viereck, who described it as 'the taking 
(or destruction) of other peoples' natural resources, lands, and well-
being for one's own, in the furtherance of nuclear develop1nent'. 
The tenn - with its connotations of do1ninance and imperial superi-
ority - fits the experience in Australia. When the call catne fr01n 
'hon1e', Robert Menzies, prin1e n1inister at the ti1ne, did not hes-
itate: Australian territory was iinn1ediately put at the disposal of 
the British, initially without any de1nocratic niceties. In effect, the 
de1nocratically elected prin1e 1ninister of Australia decided to 'lend 
Australia to the United Kingdo111' without the consent of its people. 
This, pointedly, was the first of the 201 conclusions of the Royal 
C0111n1ission into British NuclearTests in Australia, chaired by Ja1nes 
McClelland, in the m.id-1980s. 
A phone call was all it took. The UK prin1e nlinister Clen1ent 
Attlee rang Menzies in Septe111ber 1950 after the British high con1-
1nissioner in Canberra had passed on a top-secret message on 16 
Septe111ber. The inessage, fro1n Attlee to Menzies, said in part, ' I ain 
telegraphing to you now to ask first whether the Australian Govern-
111ent would be prepared in principle to agree that the first United 
Kingdon1 at0111ic weapon should be tested in Australian territory 
and secondly, if so, whether they would agree to our experts 1naking 
a detailed reconnaissance of the Monte Bello Islands so that a finn 
decision can be taken on their suitability'. Menzies agreed without 
hesitation. The nlatter was not presented to Cabinet. The test date 
was to be s01neti1ne in 1952, as British scientists were scra111bling to 
finalise construction of a workable nuclear device at Aldermaston. 
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The British surveyed the re1note Monte Bello Islands under the 
codename Epicure, the first of n1any codenames, to ensure that the 
area vvould be suitable to test Britain's first ever at0111ic weapon. 
The agreen1ent stitched up during that phone call still resonates. 
Maralinga was neither Australia's nor Britain's finest hour. Both 
countries behaved at times with questionable ethics and little regard 
for future consequences. Later investigations revealed that insuf-
ficient safeguards were in place to protect people and land, even 
allowing for the less developed understanding of inatters at0111ic 
back then. The harm done to the Indigenous population was sub-
stantial and shameful. The test authorities said openly at the tin1e 
that there was 'nothing to suffer dainage except spinifex and inulga' 
at Maralinga, despite the long and con1plex history of Indigenous 
presence there. One top-secret document prepared by the Aus-
tralian 1ninister for Supply Howard Beale when planning for the 
pennanent test range said, 'Revocation of an existing aborigines' 
reserve would be involved ... this could be achieved without undue 
difficulty as the area has not been used by aborigines for s01ne years'. 
This statement was false. 
Most of the events at Maralinga and the other nuclear test sites 
were top-secret. Today it may come as a surprise to the average 
person that Australia had a central place in the develop1nent of the 
atonuc bon1b. School history curricula tend not to nlention this 
fact . Yet, while this country sacrificed much to assist Britain's aspi-
rations to becon1e a nuclear nation, we did not benefit fr01n it. 
The evidence suggests the opposite. The UK beca1ne the world's 
third atomic power, after the US and the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics (USSR), while Australia was left with a radioactive 
conta1nination proble1n that cost tens of nilllions of dollars to 
nutigate. The report of the Royal Co1111nission in the 111id-1980s 
succinctly described Menzies' actions in making Australian ter-
ritory available without strong safeguards as both 'grovelling' and 
'insouciant' - two words that capture perfectly the tone of con-
trolled anger displayed throughout the report. The tenns of the 
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agreement struck between Australia and Britain, loosely worded 
as they were, were not to Australia's advantage in either word or 
spirit. It is hard to in1agine another country accepting the sa1ne 
conditions. Australia accepted then1 without any particularly strong 
overt pressure fro1n the UK and even volunteered to bear part of the 
cost, which the British had not requested. The weight of colonial 
history provided the true pressure, reflecting how Australia sa\V itself 
in relation to Britain at that time. 
Canada, suggested in . the late 1940s as a possible test location 
for British bon1bs, was in 111any ways a inore logical ally in nuclear 
weapons development. Like Australia, and in contrast to the UK, it 
had large swathes of lightly populated territory. Unlike Australia, it 
also had a well-developed research effort in the field and existing 
collaborations. Canada had a formal nuclear technology develop-
1nent relationship with the US and Britain - the ABC partnership -
as part of the Manhattan Project. This gave Canada far higher status 
than Australia in the world's small nuclear club, a status that \Vould 
have ensured Canada a greater share of the fruits of the nuclear 
weapons research had the tests gone ahead there. Indeed, the British 
dangled the carrot of detailed weapons design information in front 
of the Canadians. Later, in 1963, Canada even began its own nuclear 
weapons developn1ent progran1 before abandoning it and divesting 
itself of its pennanently stationed nuclear ·weapons of US origin in 
1984. 
The UK couldn't have access to the US test sites, so Canada 
was the next choice. The British surveyed seven sites there and 
favoured the ren1ote northerly port of Churchill in Hudson Bay, 
part of the Province of Manitoba. However, when the Canadians 
learned that the British intended to conduct at least 12 111ajor atmnic 
bomb tests that would severely contaminate a new 450-n1etre circle 
each time, they swiftly declined. The Canadians were a little too 
concerned to protect their own interests. 
Australia did not have the sa1ne standing in British eyes as 
Canada. Although both countries were forn1er colonies, Australia 
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had no fonn at all in the field. Until the postwar era, the best Austral-
ian physicists went abroad to do their research, including the great 
Australian physicist Mark Oliphant, who launched his fonnidable 
career at Cambridge's legendary Cavendish Laboratory as a student 
of nuclear physics pioneer Ernest Rutherford. Australian nuclear 
physics research really got started when Oliphant, back in Australia, 
lured ErnestTitterton from the UK in the early 1950s. Titterton set 
up the Department of Nuclear Physics at Canberra's fledgling Aus-
tralian National University (ANU).The British atomic ·weapons test 
plan was being formulated at the tin1e, and Titterton is pr01ninent 
in the Maralinga story. The two men fell out though. Oliphant, one 
of the world's most eininent scientists, was vociferously opposed to 
scientific secrecy and was considered by the An1ericans to be a secu-
rity risk. The test authorities shunned hi1n when he later beca1ne a 
critic of the nuclear tests in Australia. 
This story is not as simple as the oppression of a fonner colony 
by a fading i1nperial power, however.Australia entered into the agree-
ment with considerable an1bitions of its own. The Menzies govern-
ment had its reasons, not all of the1n sycophantic. One incentive was 
to maxin1ise the value of the country's newly discovered and extensive 
uraniu1n resources. Uraniun1 was the raw n1aterial for both ato111ic 
weaponry and at01nic energy, but few countries in the world pos-
sessed it in such large and accessible quantities. Second, the Australian 
Government believed that if nuclear war 100111ed, assisting Britain 
with its nuclear progra111 would help guarantee Australia's own pro-
tection by Britain at least, and possibly the US as \vell. A third reason 
was that in the 1950s, Australia toyed with the idea of both civilian 
nuclear power and its own nuclear weaponry. Who better to learn 
fr01n than the British (especially as the US would not countenance 
the idea)? But none of these ulterior motives came to fruition. 
This story of many parts is also a Cold War tale. After the end of 
World War II, the British warti1n e leader Winston Churchill declared 
that an 'iron curtain' had descended across Europe. This ideological 
divide - between the West on one side and the com1nunist nations 
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headed by the USSR on the other - soon sparked an anns race 
based upon the devastating new weapons demonstrated in Japan. 
The Soviet Union, with considerable input from the atonuc spies 
who feature later in this book, tested its own aton1ic bomb just four 
years later, in 1949. 
The Cold War brought secrecy and suspicion into the dealings 
not just between enenlies, but ~so between allies. In Australia, the 
Cold War ruptured security relationships with both Britain and the 
US.A spy ring uncovered after the war at the Soviet En1bassy in Can-
berra iinplicated a nun1ber of Australian public servants (although 
no charges were laid). The British rocket tests at Woo1nera, also in 
the South Australian desert, were te1nporarily suspended because 
of these security concerns. Australia was forced to convince both 
the UK and the US that it could keep security secrets. Australia's 
domestic spy service, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisa-
tion (ASIO), was established in 1949 during the dying days of the 
Chifley Labor governn1ent, under explicit pressure fron1 the two 
allies. Despite the advent of ASI 0, and the even 1nore shadowy Aus-
tralian Secret Intelligence Service in 1952, neither Britain nor the 
US really trusted Australia. In the end, Britain provided no nuclear 
secrets to Australia, and Australia \Vas peculiarly reluctant to ask for 
then1, even when they were being gathered on its own soil. 
This is a story of scientific progress as well, and particularly the 
relatively new science of nuclear physics. Many of the 1nain protag-
onists in the Maralinga tale were physicists. So1ne were well inside 
the Maralinga tent, such as the head of the series, Williain Penney, 
and the scientist often said to have been 'planted on Menzies', Ernest 
Titterton. Titterton was famously characterised as a Dr Strangelove 
figure, md his reputation was trashed during the McClelland Royal 
Co1runission. Penney's reputation came out the other side rather 
better, though still damaged by the cloak and dagger. Other scien-
tists, particularly the Australians Mark Oliphant and Hedley Mar-
ston, were on the outer. They had grave doubts about the nuclear 
tests in Australia and paid a professional price for raising them. 
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The science itself is a1nazing. A once largely worthless heavy 
ele1nent, uranium, had suddenly and dramatically revealed its hidden 
explosive energy potential at the beginning ofWorld War II. Physi-
cists working in Britain recognised the significance of'splitting the 
ato111' and developed practical ideas about how to fashion an explo-
sive device. They handed these over to the US Manhattan Project. 
Within six years, the basic physics that had brought to light hitherto 
unknown capacities in uranium had resulted in a bomb powered 
by uranium being dropped on Hiroshima. The bomb dropped on 
Nagasaki three days later was powered by plutoniun1, a step-up in 
technology. Plutonium, a most unnatural and dangerous inaterial, is 
one of the inost important things to understand about Maralinga, 
because when plutonium fell to earth there it changed the landscape 
forever. 
Australia's media underwent a profound transition during the 
decades of this story. The articles published in the Australian n1edia 
at the time of the nuclear tests, and particularly in the early years, 
were often deferential to Great Britain, overtly patriotic, uncriti-
cal of atonric weaponry or actively in favour of it, focused alinost 
exclusively on storylines provided by official inforn1ation, and lack-
ing scientific detail or analysis. Ahnost always, statements fron1 test 
personnel and fron1 the Australian Government immediately allayed 
any safety concerns raised in these stories. Many of these assurances 
were shown later to be unfounded. A few conten1porary stories 
were critical of delays to scheduled tests or raised questions about 
the safety of Indigenous people in the area and the cost-effectiveness 
of the Maralinga facility. Some were apparently n1otivated by ideo-
logical opposition to the federal government. But the general thrust 
of 1nost stories and editorials was support of the test series and the 
nuclear ambitions that underpinned it. The high-profile scien-
tists involved, such as Penney and Titterton, were not subjected to 
scrutiny. 
This began to change in the n1id-1970s with a series of stories 
characterised by a productive scepticism towards the governments 
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involved in the testing, a far higher level of scientific literacy and 
insight, a diversity of sources and a willingness to confront the gov-
ernment with evidence of untruth and cover-up. With hindsight 
both the initial phase of secrecy and cover-up and the later uncov-
ering seem inevitable. In fact, the saine information controls were 
in operation in the late 1970s, and the Coalition govern1nent of 
the ti111e, under Malcoltn Fraser, was no keener to reveal the truth 
of Maralinga than the Menzies government before it, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons. But the rising voices of aggrieved military veterans 
and the advocacy of a s1nall nu1nber of politicians such as T01n Uren 
provided new sources. The inarkedly different ways the British tests 
were covered by journalists in the two eras can be explained largely 
by the approach of the n1edia and the anger of those harn1ed by the 
tests, not by changes to the operation of government.The journalists 
did a 1nuch better job in the later era, forcing a lot of the story into 
the light. 
In the saga of nuclear colonialis111 portrayed in this book, 
a non-nuclear nation ceded part of its territory to an en1erging 
nuclear nation to test the n1ost destructive weapons ever invented. 
Australia provided the site, the political backing, 111any of the run-
ning costs of the Maralinga range and some of the logistics and 
nlilitary personnel. But the UK was always in charge. The absence 
of close conten1porary scrutiny of these tests by either the Australian 
Govermnent or the media allowed the test authorities to conduct 
experi111ents of exceptionally high risk and lasting danger. Many 
hundreds of Indigenous people lost access to their homelands and 
their traditional ways of life, swept away from the desert test sites 
like detritus. Military personnel from all the countries involved, but 
especially those of Britain itself, were exposed to radiation that 1nay 
have made them ill. The test series included particularly dai1ger-
ous experi1nents that left significant radioactive conta1nination at 
Maralinga. The nuclear tests were not subjected to the 111edia scru-
tiny and analysis befitting their importance until many years later. In 
fact, the British nuclear tests are ainong the 1nost significant events 
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in Australia's history not subjected to contemporary media scrutiny. 
What are we to inake of the events at Maralinga in the 19 50s and 
1960s? Australia was not a nuclear power. The nation was in a highly 
ambiguous position - it was the staging ground for nuclear weapons 
testing, but the tests the1nselves were run with obsessive secrecy and 
control by another nation, the 'mother country' herself. This n1ade 
Australia, at least initially, curiously powerless and inept in dealing 
with the tests. The absence of media coverage and public debate 
created a gap in 1nost people's understanding of Maralinga, n1aking 
it in many ways a uniquely tangled national issue, still obscure and 
perplexing. The fallout fro111 nuclear colonialism in Australia was 
plutoniu1n-soaked land, certainly, but also growing recognition of 
the risks inherent in abdicating control over the nation's destiny. 
The 1nysteries of Maralinga and its toxic legacy continue to haunt 
Australia as the red dust of the old desert test site still swirls and the 
thunder echoes across the plain. 
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